12 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |