Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason'', 'Axioms for the Part Relation' and 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13418 The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
13419 If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13417 If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10650 In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
13047 It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
13065 Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]