Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness' and 'Intellectual Autobiography'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

27 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18901 Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
18895 Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
9065 S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
18897 Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18893 Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18903 Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
18894 Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18900 Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064 Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044 If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
9048 The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
9055 The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049 Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
9056 Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
9058 Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
9059 The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
9060 Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050 A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
9061 People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
9062 If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
9063 How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9045 Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
9047 Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
9053 If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18898 In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]