19 ideas
22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |