24 ideas
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |