86 ideas
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |