13 ideas
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |