24 ideas
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |