Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Letters to Leibniz' and 'Logical Necessity'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16519 No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]