56 ideas
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
20422 | The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |