Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'Logicism in the 21st Century'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
2764 Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19080 Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
8784 Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
8787 The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8788 Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
8783 Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8786 One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]