28 ideas
23392 | The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
23408 | The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden] |
23407 | Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |