Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Infinitism solution to regress problem'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]