11 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 18085 | Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy] |
| 18084 | When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |