11 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |