20 ideas
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |