Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Conditionals (Stanf)' and 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
14273 Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
14281 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
14284 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14270 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
14269 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14275 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
14276 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
14290 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14282 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]