34 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |