Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'On Second-Order Logic' and 'What is it like to be a bat?'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
'∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]