43 ideas
| 14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
| 14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
| 19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
| 12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
| 12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
| 12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
| 12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
| 12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
| 12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
| 12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
| 12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
| 12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
| 12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
| 12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
| 12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
| 12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
| 12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
| 12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
| 12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
| 12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
| 12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
| 14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
| 14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
| 14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
| 19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
| 19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
| 19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
| 19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
| 19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
| 19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
| 12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
| 12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
| 12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
| 12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
| 19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
| 19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
| 19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
| 19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
| 19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
| 19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
| 19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |