Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things' and 'Value Theory'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]