92 ideas
| 7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
| 2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
| 2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
| 1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
| 2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
| 23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| 2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
| 2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
| 2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
| 2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
| 20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
| 2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
| 20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
| 2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
| 2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
| 2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
| 2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
| 2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
| 7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
| 6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
| 20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
| 20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
| 22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
| 2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |