Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'The Case for Closure' and 'Logicism Revisited'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
14765 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
14766 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]