Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics' and 'Metaphysics: an introduction'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
18859 Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18861 Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18866 Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18860 A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18863 What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
18865 Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9073 Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J]
9074 Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J]
9072 Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18862 Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]