19 ideas
| 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
| 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
| 9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
| 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
| 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
| 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
| 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
| 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
| 14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |