Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'Things and Their Parts' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
13407 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13409 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
13406 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
14765 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
13408 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
14766 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]