30 ideas
| 19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
| 19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
| 19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
| 19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |