Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'On Duties ('De Officiis')' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]