43 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
7082 | Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
22155 | We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |