Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Problems of Knowledge' and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

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58 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]