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All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'I.39 On Solitude' and 'On Denoting'

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62 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]