Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'The Logic of What Might Have Been' and 'Treatise of Human Nature'

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92 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume]
There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume]
Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume]
If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume]