Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'The Logic of What Might Have Been' and 'Letter to Menoeceus'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14052 Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
14062 Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
1837 We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
1836 Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
14061 Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14055 The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
14054 Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
14053 It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
14058 Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
1833 Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
14057 All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
14063 Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
14059 The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
1835 True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
14056 We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
14060 Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]