28 ideas
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
| 16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
| 16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
| 16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
| 16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
| 16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
| 16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
| 16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |