79 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
| 1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
| 11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
| 18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
| 11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
| 11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
| 11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
| 11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
| 11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
| 1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
| 1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
| 18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
| 13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
| 16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
| 11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
| 16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
| 16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
| 16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
| 8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
| 12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
| 11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
| 12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
| 1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |