14 ideas
| 14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
| 14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
| 17818 | How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau] |
| 17822 | Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau] |
| 17817 | Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau] |
| 17815 | We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau] |
| 17821 | You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau] |
| 14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
| 14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
| 14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |