35 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |