20 ideas
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |