Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Symposium' and 'The Semantic Conception of Truth'

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58 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]