50 ideas
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |