49 ideas
| 14179 | The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 1607 | Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 174 | True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 180 | We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato] |
| 181 | Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 4026 | Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato] |
| 172 | Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato] |
| 173 | Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato] |
| 183 | Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato] |
| 184 | Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato] |
| 171 | Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato] |
| 176 | Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato] |
| 14177 | Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato] |
| 179 | Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato] |
| 177 | If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato] |
| 14178 | Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato] |
| 170 | The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato] |
| 182 | The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 175 | Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |