60 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
1553 | No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
1545 | Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
1547 | Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras] |
3305 | There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3317 | You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3313 | If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
606 | Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
612 | Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
247 | God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras] |
10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
6016 | Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD] |
1580 | For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik] |
205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
1659 | Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos] |
532 | Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras] |
1552 | He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
1551 | He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras] |