59 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
| 11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
| 12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
| 19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
| 19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
| 17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
| 12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
| 2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |