Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Theory of Epistemic Rationality' and 'Plato on Parts and Wholes'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
15842 An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15841 Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15858 Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837 What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
15839 If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
15838 The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19708 Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]