Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'The Logic of Decision' and 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson]