67 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |