27 ideas
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
| 14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
| 14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |