37 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |