17 ideas
| 15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
| 15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
| 15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
| 15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
| 15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
| 15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |