19 ideas
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |